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ABSTRACT
Quantitative methodology has a contested role in feminist scholarship which remains almost ex-
clusively qualitative. Considering Irigaray’s notion of mimicry, Spivak’s strategic essentialism,
and Butler’s contingent foundations, the essentialising implications of quantitative methodology
may prove less problematic if research projects assert strategic or political feminist aims. Still, a
feminist deconstructive argument can be formed against quantitative studies in which socially
constructed categories are considered independently determined. However, by application of
Williams’ ideas of treating the categories in question as dependently rather than independently
determined, social categories can be deconstructed quantitatively, enriching both the theoretical
and empirical understandings of population-level social constructions of genders, ethnicities etc.
Quantitative deconstruction has the potential to reconcile anti-essentialism and quantitative
methodology, and thus, to make peace in the quantitative/qualitative Paradigm Wars.  
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Alarge proportion
of gender research now actively engages with
quantitative methodology, especially in the
US, but explicitly feminist research remains
almost exclusively qualitatitive (Cohen et al.
2011). Despite frequent feminist promotions
of quantitative methodology (e.g. Jayaratne
& Stewart 1991; Oakley 1998, 2000), the
Paradigm Wars are still being fought;
feminism and quantitative methodology are
yet to be united in general practice. 
Feminist theorists have argued that
quantitative methods are androcentric and
have been created to support patriarchal
social structures (Harding 1986; Jayaratne &
Stewart 1991). Furthermore, feminists
recognise that the experiences of a woman –
or indeed, of any individual – cannot be
captured by numbers without essentialising
the identities of the researched subjects. The
essentialising implications of categorisation
and of a binary gender variable in
quantitative research directly conflict with
feminist theories of deconstruction. On the
other hand, it is hard to argue against the
application of quantitative methods in the
interests of uncovering and providing
evidence of gender discrimination – for
example, studies of population-level wage
inequalities – even though these inequalities
are socially constructed (Cohen et al. 2011).
Consequently, feminist resistance to the
application of quantitative methods has
provoked other social scientists undertaking
gender research: 
Perhaps somewhat polemically, we argue that
gender studies pose a particular challenge to
the quest of raising quantitative methodolo-
gical standards. In part, this is because, in the
earlier phase of feminist writing, qualitative
methods were often seen as preferable to
quantitative approaches. It is also the case
that some social scientists lack confidence in
numerical skills and have a fear of statistics
(Scott 2010: 226).
Unfortunately, existing feminist promotions
of quantitative methodologies have not suc-
ceeded; feminist research continues to be al-
most exclusively qualitatitive (Cohen et al.
2011). At the same time, non-feminist scho-
lars widely engage in quantitative research
on women, but from a feminist perspective,
“[i]t is hard to watch researchers without
feminist training do research on women
and without concern for its impact on
women or on feminism” (Williams 2012:
84). In the interests of facilitating explicitly
feminist applications of quantitative meth-
ods, I aim to recover a distinctively feminist
approach to quantitative methodology by
reconciling anti-essentialism and quantita-
tive methodology. I attempt to show that
research questions that require the applica-
tion of quantitative methods can also be
answered from a feminist perspective.
This article is structured into four sec-
tions, followed by concluding remarks. The
first section briefly outlines feminist argu-
ments against quantitative methodology, as
well as existing feminist promotions of
quantitative methodology. In the second
section, I discuss how standard applications
of quantitative methods in the social sci-
ences unavoidably involve essentialising in-
dividuals through categorisation. In the
third section, feminist theory is revisited in
order to provide a discussion of essential-
ism, anti-essentialism, and deconstruction
in the context of quantitative methodology.
In the final section, I suggest that a distinc-
tively feminist approach to quantitative
methodology can be recovered by reconcil-
ing anti-essentialism and quantitative
methodology through a process of quanti-
tative deconstruction of social categories.
THE PARADIGM WARS
First, the background to the discussion of
anti-essentialism and quantitative method-
ology is briefly outlined, paying particular
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attention to the so-called Paradigm Wars
and to suggested ways of making peace in
these wars. Toby E. Jayaratne and Abigail J.
Stewart (1991), and Ann Oakley (1998,
2000) reviewed the arguments for and
against applications of quantitative methods
in feminist research, highlighting how “the
early feminist methodology texts all cele-
brated qualitative methods as best suited to
the project of hearing women’s accounts of
their experiences” (Oakley 1998: 708, my
emphasis). From a feminist perspective, tra-
ditional scientific methods, and particularly
quantitative methods, were seen as regres-
sive, sexist, and androcentric (e.g. Gilligan
1982; Harding 1986). Stemming from
these feminist reservations about the appli-
cation of positivist, quantitative methods,
and from the celebration of qualitative
methods in feminist scholarship, the ‘para-
digm argument’ arose – that is, the argu-
ment that qualitative and quantitative
methodologies represent two different and
incompatible paradigms in the social
sciences. Oakley (1998) characterized the
established feminist resistance to quantita-
tive methodology by means of her notion
of the ‘three p’s’:
Underlying the various arguments in the fem-
inist case against quantitative methods are
three fundamental objections: the case against
positivism; the case against power; and the case
against p values, or against the use of statisti-
cal techniques as a means of establishing the
validity of research findings (Oakley 1998:
709-710, emphasis in the original).
Positivism is dangerous since research out-
comes are presented as objective facts, but
in feminism, traditional “‘Objectivity’ is re-
framed as ‘male subjectivity’” (Oakley 1998:
710). Power refers to the conventional hier-
archical relationship between the researcher
and the researched. From a feminist per-
spective, this exploitative relationship itself
makes research findings invalid. P values re-
fer to tests for statistical significance in
quantitative research. Reducing the signifi-
cance of studied subjects and their experi-
ences to a single number is also problematic
from a feminist perspective (Oakley 1998).
After outlining the background of the
Paradigm Wars, Jayaratne and Stewart
(1991), and Oakley (1998, 2000) also pro-
posed ways to make peace by suggesting re-
search strategies that directly target the fem-
inist criticisms of quantitative methodology.
Three of the proposed research strategies
relate directly to the topic of this article.
First, they recommended choosing re-
search methods after deciding on a research
question, hence selecting the best methods
to address the problem in question. Jacque-
line Scott (2010) also supported the view
that one should not talk about a superior
methodology, but rather consider the metho-
dology that best fits one’s research ques-
tion. Ask a question and subsequently apply
the methods that can optimally answer it.
Secondly, researchers should leave be-
hind the dichotomy between quantitative
and qualitative methodologies, and apply
mixed methods and triangulation when ap-
propriate. The social sciences have the po-
tential to challenge the standard, single-
methodology approach, and to combine
the strengths of theoretical, qualitative, and
quantitative methodologies – ‘triangula-
tion’ could improve the validity and robust-
ness of research outcomes (Hughes & Co-
hen 2010). Triangulation appeared as a way
to find peace in the “war-of-words” about
applied methods (Scott 2010: 223), and
Scott (2010: 235) highlighted how “quali-
tative research can help inform the way that
quantitative researchers (some of whom are
feminists) interpret what they count.”
Thirdly, the applied methods should al-
ways be questioned and justified directly by
researchers in their published work. Metho-
dological reflections are at the centre of
feminist theory, and strengthening the focus
on methodological reflections in quantita-
tive research could target the feminist criti-
cisms of quantitative methodology itself.
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These three research strategies could po-
tentially challenge the qualitative/quantita-
tive dichotomy and facilitate feminist appli-
cations of quantitative methods. However,
Scott notes that: 
Some readers will remain unconvinced that
quantitative research can help feminist inquiry.
They will insist that women’s experiences
cannot be reduced to numbers. No serious
social scientist would claim that they could be
(Scott 2010: 234). 
Even if no social scientist would claim that
individuals’ experiences can be reduced to
numbers, this is what quantitative method-
ology does: individuals become rows and
columns in a spreadsheet. As a result: 
Articles written from an explicitly feminist
perspective or with feminist or transformative
methodological justifications very rarely em-
ploy quantification. There is, therefore, little
here to suggest that feminists use quantitative
methods (Cohen et al. 2011: 581-582). 
Thus, the qualitative/quantitative dichoto-
my persists in general feminist practice, and
the promotions of quantitative methodolo-
gy put forward by Jayaratne and Stewart
(1991), and Oakley (1998, 2000) have not
succeeded in uniting feminism and quanti-
tative methodology.
The following section explores further
how quantitative methodology essentialises
individuals and their identities, before mov-
ing on to a theoretical discussion of the im-
plications of essentialism. The discussion of
essentialism makes it possible to suggest a
distinctively feminist approach to quantita-




Quantitative methodology relies on coded
categories, categorical variables. In the con-
text of this articl, the most obvious categor-
ical variable is the gender or sex variable,
which is normally treated as a given, inde-
pendent variable, and not as a dependent
variable.1 Already here, a feminist issue aris-
es: quantitative researchers often do not
distinguish between gender and sex
(Williams 2010). Judith Butler (1992: 17)
branded this form of categorisation and
discourse of sex ‘material violence’. Never-
theless, the gender/sex variable is coded: 0
for men, 1 for women. Almost all quantita-
tive studies examining gender build on this
dichotomous, binary gender variable, again
conflicting with deconstructive develop-
ments within feminist thought, which re-
ject the gender binary.
In statistical multivariate modelling, in-
tersectionality is introduced by adding more
categorical variables: one each for ethnicity,
religion, disability etc. (e.g. Metcalf 2009).
Many datasets come with variables at differ-
ent levels of detail. For example, the UK
Labour Force Survey, which provides quar-
terly datasets describing the UK labour mar-
ket, includes several categorical variables for
ethnicity, providing a range of 7 to 18 eth-
nic subcategories (Office for National
Statistics 2014). Thus, the quantitative re-
searcher is left with a choice – not necessar-
ily an objective choice – between including
more subcategories, risking statistically in-
significant results due to smaller sample
sizes, or including fewer subcategories, thus
losing the diversity and detail the dataset
actually provides. In other words, the re-
searcher chooses how much to reduce or
essentialise the identity of the studied sub-
jects, and hence also chooses which axes of
power to (un)cover (Cho et al. 2013).
When individuals are categorised to pro-
vide a numerical dataset, the statistician sac-
rifices variability in the lived experience of
their researched subjects – the identities of
the subjects are essentialised. Much femi-
nist theory reflects on the topic of essential-
ism, and Ellen Rooney pointed out that:
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Feminisms return to the problem of essential-
ism – despite their shared distaste for the
mystifications of Woman – because it remains
difficult to engage in feminist analysis and
politics if not ‘as a woman’ (Spivak & Rooney
1993: 2). 
In order to reconcile feminist anti-essential-
ism and quantitative methodology, this dis-
sension between the theoretical and politi-
cal aspects of feminisms is crucial to under-
stand. Therefore, the next section revisits
feminist theory and provides a discussion of
essentialism, anti-essentialism, and decon-




Essentialism and anti-essentialism have
been central themes in feminist literature
for decades. However, in a 1984 interview
with Elizabeth Gross, Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak reignited the debate when introduc-
ing her idea of strategic essentialism in the
context of clitoridectomy and the forma-
tion of a feminist practice and discourse:
I think we have to choose again strategically,
not universal discourse but essentialist dis-
course. I think that since as a deconstruc-
tivist, – see, I just took a label upon myself –
I cannot in fact clean my hands and say I’m
specific. In fact I must say I am an essentialist
from time to time (Spivak 1985: 183).
Spivak found strategic essentialism applica-
ble not only in feminist and women’s dis-
courses, but also in the context of her ana-
lysis of the work by the Subaltern Stu-
dies Group. Here, Spivak again applied the
concept of strategic essentialism and elabo-
rates on its implications for the studied
subject:
(…) I would suggest that elements in their
text would warrant a reading of the project to
retrieve the subaltern consciousness as the at-
tempt to undo a massive historiographic met-
alepsis and “situate” the effect of the subject
as subaltern. I would read it, then, as a strate-
gic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupu-
lously visible political interest (…) This would
allow them to use the critical force of anti-hu-
manism, in other words, even as they share its
constitutive paradox: that the essentializing
moment, the object of their criticism, is irre-
ducible (Spivak 1987: 205, emphasis in the
original).
Speaking as a deconstructionist, Spivak’s
promotion of this strategic form of essen-
tialism received a lot of attention, but
mainly because of its essentialising element.
Spivak’s work on French philosophy was
reflected in her statements about essential-
ism. Not only had Derrida been a topic of
much of her research, but she also found
inspiration in Lucy Irigaray’s writing. De-
spite the often essentialist reading of Iri-
garay’s work, her notion of mimicry also
proved important for the role of strategic
essentialism. In this context, Spivak chal-
lenged her readers and asked “Why do we
become essentialist readers when we read
someone like Irigaray?” (Spivak & Rooney
1993: 17). Spivak encouraged us to read
Irigaray within the tradition of French writ-
ing in which she was situated. In her essay,
The Power of Discourse and the Subordina-
tion of the Feminine, Irigaray summed up
her ideas of mimicry as a tool for feminism:
To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to
try to recover the place of her exploitation by
discourse, without allowing herself to be sim-
ply reduced to it. It means to resubmit herself
– inasmuch as she is on the side of the ‘per-
ceptible’, of ‘matter’ – to ‘ideas’, in particular
to ideas about herself, that are elaborated
in/by a masculine logic, but so as to make
‘visible’, by an effect of playful repetition,
what was supposed to remain invisible: the
cover-up of a possible operation of the femi-
nine in language. It also means ‘to unveil’ the
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fact that, if women are such good mimics, it
is because they are not simply resorbed in this
function (Irigaray 1991: 124).
Irigaray’s encouragement to apply mimesis,
however, did not mean that women should
adopt the patriarchal discourse and thereby
define women relative to men. Neverthe-
less, it did imply that women could use a
male discourse, such as a quantitative one,
to “recover the place of her exploitation”
(Irigaray 1991: 124). Still, Irigaray main-
tained that women’s movements often
challenged only the distribution of power,
not the power structure itself, thereby
again subjecting themselves to the phallo-
cratic order (Irigaray 1991: 128). Again, a
tension between theoretical and strategical
arguments arose – the aim was to challenge
the phallic order, but the practical tool,
mimesis, would do so from within this or-
der. Whitford pointed out how Irigaray’s
work developed over time:
The direction her work is taking involves a
more direct focus on women’s civil status,
their position as a sex before the law, the
need for womankind to be recognized as a
genre distinct from mankind, and the impor-
tance of translating sexual difference into spe-
cific social forms, both to mediate relations
between women themselves, and also to lay
claim to an existence embodied in distinct
and concrete instances as a basis for relation-
ships with and negotiations with the world of
men (Whitford 1991: 10, emphasis in the
original).
The essentialist aspect of Irigaray’s work
arose as she wrote from a perspective of dif-
ference, claiming a space for womankind
and mankind respectively. Deconstruction-
ists would, as Spivak and Butler do, see
both ‘kinds’ as a product of social interac-
tions and constructions. At the same time,
however, according to Butler, Irigaray ar-
gued that “women constitute a paradox, if
not a contradiction, within the discourse of
identity itself. Women are the ‘sex’ which is
not ‘one.’ Within a language pervasively
masculinist, a phallogocentric language,
women constitute the unrepresentable”
(Butler 2006: 13, emphasis in the original).
Perhaps, then, Irigaray essentialised less
than is often assumed. In fact, Xu (1995)
found that the controversy over Irigaray’s
essentialism arose when the strategic aspect
of her application of mimicry was disre-
garded. 
After the publication of Gender Trouble
in 1990, Butler also entered the discussion
about the notion of ‘women’ as a political
category in 1991 with the first version of
her article on Contingent Foundations. In
1992, the final version appeared as part of
the collection Feminists Theorize the Politi-
cal, which Butler and Joan W. Scott edited
together. Already in the introduction, to-
gether they targeted the interaction, or
rather the tension, between the theoretical
and the strategic:
To perform a feminist deconstruction of
some of the primary terms of political dis-
course is in no sense to censor their usage,
negate them, or to announce their
anachronicity. On the contrary, this kind of
analysis requires that these terms be reused
and rethought, exposed as strategic instru-
ments and effects, and subjected to a critical
reinscription and redeployment (Butler &
Scott 1992: xiv, emphasis in the original).
Butler’s own contribution to the collection
explored this relationship further, and like
Spivak, she found a place for a strategic or
political use of categorical terms:
To deconstruct the concept of matter or that
of bodies is not to negate or refuse either
term. To deconstruct these terms means,
rather, to continue to use them, to repeat
them, to repeat them subversively, and to dis-
place them from the contexts in which they
have been deployed as instruments of oppres-
sive power (Butler 1992: 17)
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Butler admitted that categories such as
‘women’ and ‘men’ could be used, but on-
ly subversively. In Bodies That Matter, But-
ler elaborated on the difference between a
term’s metaphysical presence and the politi-
cal aims it could serve: by re-examining a
certain term, one could “free it from its
metaphysical lodgings (…) to permit the
term to occupy and serve very different po-
litical aims” (Butler 1993: 30). From this
statement, it follows that a researcher can
indeed apply categorical terminology, even
from Butler’s deconstructive point of view,
but subversion is the prerequisite for its ap-
plication.
Now, it is interesting to consider the bi-
nary gender variable denoting ‘women’ and
‘men’. They are categories and terms that
have indeed been employed by oppressive
powers, but if these categories themselves
can be used to prove this oppression and
the implied power relations, is that not to
use them subversively, as Butler proposed?
They would then serve a clearly feminist
political aim. The categorical discourse,
however, can remain oppressive if one is
not careful to address the ‘metaphysical
lodgings’ of terms (Butler 1993: 50),
which is often neglected by quantitative re-
searchers. Nevertheless, Butler further ac-
knowledged that a foundationalist move: 
(...) can be used as a part of such a radical
agenda. Note that I have said, ‘it can be
used’: I think there are no necessary political
consequences for such a theory, but only a
possible political deployment (Butler 1992: 8).
Still, this should not be seen as uncondi-
tional support for Spivak’s strategic essen-
tialism, and especially not of essentialism it-
self. Indeed, in Gender Trouble, Butler
shifted the focus from the need of cate-
gories for a political agenda: “Instead, we
ought to ask what political possibilities are
the consequence of a radical critique of the
categories of identity” (Butler 2006: xxxii).
Later, Butler concluded that feminist theo-
ry had agreed that an essentialist category,
‘women’, was no longer useful in unifying
the diverse lives and experiences of those
who could be defined as women (Butler et
al. 2004: 336).
Spivak and Butler did not predict the
consequences of their promotion of strate-
gic essentialism and foundationalist moves
in the name of feminist political aims. In-
deed, Spivak later reconsidered her call for
strategic essentialism because her readers
tended to focus on ‘essentialism’ and for-
got about the ‘strategic’ (Spivak & Rooney
1993: 5). Therefore, she withdrew her sup-
port of the term because of its misuse,
rather than because she gave up on it or the
project itself (Danius et al. 1993). As Spi-
vak explained, “my notion just simply be-
came the union ticket for essentialism”
(Danius et al. 1993: 35), and it was never
her intention to provide such a ticket. Simi-
larly, Butler realised that strategy should
not be the only consideration to make
when applying certain categorical terms in
a political context. She emphasised that the
semantic meaning of a term “travels
through discourse” in ways that authors
cannot predict (Butler et al. 2004: 331).
Hence, one must consider the ontological
development of categorical terms. Butler
concluded her thoughts on the strategic or
political uses of essentialist terms by reflect-
ing on her ideas from Bodies That Matter:
“So, I guess I would be a little less opti-
mistic about the possibility of a radical un-
mooring than I was in 1993” (Butler et al.
2004: 331). Radical unmooring was sacri-
ficed because of the unintended implica-
tions of essentialist terminology and cate-
gorisation, and the place for quantitative
methodology in feminist research remains
unclear. However, the next section will
show that deconstruction of social cate-
gories and the analysis of discourse are not
necessarily incompatible with quantitative
methodology.
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QUANTITATIVE DECONSTRUCTION
Within the disciplines of linguistics and so-
ciolinguistics, discourse analysis has enabled
the deconstruction of essentialist terminol-
ogy, social categories, and their implica-
tions (Lazaraton 2002). Discourse analysis
can even be performed quantitatively by
codifying transcribed discourse, although
this application of quantitative methods has
also been contested (e.g. Schegloff 1993).
Still, it remains difficult to apply the decon-
structive principles of discourse analysis in
certain areas of the social sciences, for ex-
ample, in economic studies of population-
level wage inequalities.
Thus, the question remains: How can
the use of a binary gender variable be com-
patible with a deconstructive feminist pro-
ject if strategy is not enough to secure
compatibility? To answer this question, the
ideas of sociologist and demographist Jill
R. Williams (2010) provide valuable in-
sights. Demographers have traditionally
claimed to be scientific; they have argued
to remain objective in their research
(Williams 2010). However, as feminists
have long realised, such positivist objectivi-
ty is impossible to retain, independently of
the choice of method. Therefore, Williams
(2010) proposed several feminist changes
to the discourse in demographic research,
but even more interestingly, she also sug-
gested a method for examining the social
constructions of genders quantitatively, that
is, by treating gender as a dependent vari-
able. Analysing gender as a dependent vari-
able would enable the quantitative re-
searcher to determine which social con-
structions that make up genders, contrast-
ing traditional quantitative research which
takes gender as given. Williams (2010:
205) explained:
An important point here is that because gen-
der is an essential dependent variable, demo-
graphic research should study how demo-
graphic processes influence gendered process-
es, including gender inequality. 
Going from treating gender as an indepen-
dent variable to treating it as a dependent
variable would have important implications:
researchers would no longer take gender as
something independently, or indeed natu-
rally given, but would rather view the cate-
gories ‘women’ and ‘men’ as constructions
of all the other variables that datasets pro-
vide for their analysis. In other words, gen-
ders can also be deconstructed quantita-
tively, not only discursively. 
Quantitative deconstruction of social
categories could yield important insights
into the population-level social construc-
tions of genders, ethnicities etc. By reapply-
ing deconstructive principles from dis-
course analysis, quantitative deconstruction
could supplement the theoretical and em-
pirical understandings of categorical vari-
ables and of the underlying identities of the
researched subjects. Quantitative decon-
struction has the potential to reconcile an-
ti-essentialism and quantitative methodolo-
gy and to join anticategorical and inter-
categorical approaches to intersectionality
(McCall 2005). Hence, a distinctively femi-
nist approach to quantitative methodology
exists, and it can even be applied to pro-
mote a deconstructive feminist project. 
CONCLUSIONS
From a theoretical perspective, quantitative
methodology is problematic not only be-
cause of its patriarchal origins, but also be-
cause of its essentialising implications.
However, Oakley (1998: 725) pointed out
that a feminist rejection of quantitative
methodology is itself essentialising: 
The case against quantitative ways of know-
ing is based on a rejection of reason and sci-
ence as masculine and an embracing of expe-
rience as feminine; but this is essentialist
thinking which buys into the very paradox
that it protests about. 
Essentialism, therefore, is a challenge for
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feminist researchers that should be tackled
by leaving the quantitative/qualitative
Paradigm Wars behind, rather than by op-
posing quantitative methodology.
Also in feminist research, it is now clear
that there is no such thing as the ‘best
method’, but rather the methods that fit a
research question most aptly. The quantita-
tive/qualitative dichotomy should be left
behind to open the way for mixed methods
and triangulation, which could improve the
validity of feminist research. Feminists are
encouraged to acknowledge that 
Quantitative researchers are not naïve posi-
tivists. They acknowledge the role of social
construction in measures and are wary of
quantification being seen as the equivalent of
scientific reasoning. They know better than
most that ‘statistics can lie’ (Scott 2010: 223).
Indeed, one cannot always rely on quanti-
tative methods. However, methodological
shortcomings are not unique to statistics,
but rather to all poor research designs (Scott
2010). Depending on the research question,
one way to improve the validity and robust-
ness of research findings is through triangu-
lation and the application of mixed methods.
The discussion of Irigaray’s notion of
mimicry, Spivak’s strategic essentialism and
Butler’s contingent foundations has shown
that the essentialising implications of quan-
titative methodology are less problematic if
research projects keep a central strategic or
political feminist aim. Even though “It is
hard for the dogmatic philosopher to grasp
that a strategist is a trickster, since there is
no free play” (Spivak 1996: 159), a feminist
deconstructive argument is easily formed
against quantitative studies in which vari-
ables describing social constructs are con-
sidered to be independently determined
variables. However, Williams’ (2010) sug-
gestion that the variables in question should
be treated as dependent rather than inde-
pendent makes it possible to deconstruct
social categories quantitatively and to pro-
vide important insights into population-lev-
el social constructions of genders, ethnici-
ties etc. Such a methodological approach
could enrich both the theoretical and em-
pirical understandings of categorical vari-
ables and of researched subjects’ underlying
identities. Thus, quantitative deconstruc-
tion has the potential to reconcile anti-es-
sentialism and quantitative methodology.
Feminist research is crucial for pointing
out discrimination and inequalities, and at
the population level, quantitative method-
ology provides powerful tools for doing so.
Therefore, I encourage feminist researchers
to step outside the qualitative paradigm
and embrace the research questions for
which quantitative methods open the way.
At the same time, I encourage quantitative
researchers to embrace feminist theory and
consider its theoretical insights when doing
research on gender and women. In the po-
litical and academic battle against gender
discrimination, feminism has a key role to
play, also in quantitative studies with po-
tentially essentialising elements. As Spivak
(1993: 18) pointed out: “There is no time
for essence/anti-essence. There is so much
work to be done.”
In this article, I have demonstrated how
the Paradigm Wars may finally be left be-
hind if: 1) triangulation and mixed meth-
ods are applied when appropriate; 2) re-
searchers analyse categorical variables
strategically and subversively; and 3) anti-
essentialism and quantitative methodology
are reconciled through a process of quanti-
tative deconstruction. 
NOTES
1. The Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics defines a
dependent variable as follows (Everitt 2006: 342):
“The variable of primary importance in investiga-
tions since the major objective is usually to study
the effects of treatment and/or other explanato-
ry[/independent] variables on this variable and to
provide suitable models for the relationship between
it and the explanatory[/independent] variables.”
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